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Abstract 
Turkey was once one of the world’s largest sources of illicit opium; the majority 
diverted from sparsely regulated licit production. Since 1972, however, it has 
contributed almost no opium to the global black market. As such, Turkey is one of a 
small number of states to have eradicated, or severally reduced, the national supply of 
illicit opium. This article reconsiders post-1974 Turkish controls from a situational 
crime prevention perspective. It is suggested that Turkish success was founded upon 
reducing opportunities for diversion from regulated production by hardening targets, 
increasing formal and informal surveillance, assisting compliance through fair 
procurement practices and increasing the risk of non-compliance. 
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Introduction 
Turkey was once one of the world’s largest sources of illicit opium. Since 1972, 
however, it has contributed almost no opium to the global black market. As such, 
Turkey is one of a small number of states to have eradicated, or severally reduced, the 
national supply of illicit opium. Although the intervention has been well documented 
by a range of academic disciplines (see Spain, 1975; Brundage and Mitchell, 1977; 
West, 1992; Mansfield, 2001; Robins, 2007; Evered, 2011a), it has yet to be analysed 
from the perspective of crime prevention. The lack of attention this agricultural theft 
prevention and drug control intervention has received from criminology might be 
surprising if it were not for the general lack of attention devoted to rural crimes 
(Donnermeyer and Barclay, 2005; Mears et al, 2007). 
This article reconsiders the post-1974 Turkish controls from the perspective of 
situational crime prevention (SCP). It is suggested that success was founded upon 
reducing opportunities for diversion1 to black markets by hardening targets, 
increasing formal and informal surveillance, assisting compliance through fair 
procurement practices and increasing the risk of non-compliance. Implementation was 
supported by state and implementing institutions (including farming communities) 
being motivated by economic, institutional and political self-interest. In addition, the 
policy started from an informed foundation, and continued with focused aims and 
objectives. 
Before commencing, it is worth noting that while this article is concerned with 
the prevention of a specific offence (opium diversion), the Turkish intervention 
discussed hereafter was not part of a wider policy to disrupt illicit opiate distribution. 
Rather, Turkey’s centrality as a major transit area for illicit opiates has been 
facilitated by ‘weak, corrupt and inconsistent’ counter-trafficking policies (Paoli et al, 
2009, p. 287; McLeod, 1980; Robins, 2008). Although there have been improvements 
since the mid-1990s (Robins, 2008), Turkish state employees have protected (and 
profited from) traffickers and opiate manufacturers connected to paramilitary groups 
and Kurdish clans allied with the state (Bovenkerk and Yesilgöz, 2006; Paoli et al, 
                                            
1 ‘Diversion’ is the rather innocuous-sounding technical term by which drug policy refers to 
the theft of opium at any point along regulated production and distribution lines. This is 
different to illicit production, which is the clandestine extraction of the juice of the opium 
poppy 
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2009; Robins, 2008). Although this does not necessarily deflect from Turkish 
achievements in preventing diversion, it does suggest that a holistic counter-narcotics 
policy was not undertaken. Rather, resources were strategically applied to a segment 
of the distribution chain, which supported Turkey’s economic and political interests. 
Before discussing Turkish opium production, a brief overview of SCP will be 
provided. 
The primary theoretical assumptions of SCP are that offenders are rational 
actors (Cornish and Clarke, 2008) and offences can be reduced by blocking, reducing 
or removing the opportunities that make crime (diversion in this case) more likely 
(Clarke, 2008). An ‘overriding principle’ is to create preventive measures that change 
the ‘near’ situational causes of crime, rather than ‘distant’ causes of crime, such as 
poverty, inequality or upbringing. Although tackling distant causes may reduce 
offending in the future, changing the opportunity structure can often create immediate 
and direct reductions (Clarke, 2008, p. 180). Turkish farmers, for example, may have 
diverted opium due to poverty or alienation from urban centres of politics. While it 
may have taken decades to reduce poverty and alienation, changes to the opportunity 
structure produced immediate tangible benefits. Furthermore, reducing poverty and 
political alienation should have been policy objectives regardless of their assumed 
impact on diversion. 
The prevention of situational causes of crime is achieved by using any 
combination of 25 techniques, categorised under five headings (Clarke, 2008): 
 
1) Reduce the rewards (harden target, control access to facilities, screen exits, 
deflect offenders, controls tools/weapons). 
2) Increase the difficulty (extend guardianship, assist natural surveillance, reduce 
anonymity, use place managers, strengthen formal surveillance). 
3) Increase the effort (conceal targets, remove targets, identify property, disrupt 
markets, deny benefits). 
4) Reduce provocations (reduce frustrations and stress, avoid disputes, reduce 
temptation and arousal, neutralise peer pressure, discourage imitation). 
5) Remove excuses (set rules, post instructions, alert conscience, assist 
compliance, control drugs and alcohol). 
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This article argues that from 1974 Turkey used a combination of these 25 techniques 
to successfully prevent the diversion of opium from the state monopoly. To set the 
scene, the historical context to Turkish opium production and diversion between the 
1920s and 1974 will be provided (for a more in-depth analysis of this period see 
Windle, forthcoming). During this contextual discussion, the limitations of pre-1974 
controls will be explored. The concluding sections will analyse post-1974 Turkish 
controls by using a SCP framework and then discussing how, and why, the 
intervention was implemented. 
 
Late-1920s to 1960s: Increasing Supply and Controls 
Although Turkey had been a major global source of opium from the early nineteenth 
century (Spain, 1975), increasing demand from the European opiate manufacturers 
during the late 1920s/early 1930s inflated Turkish opium production (Eisenlohr, 1934) 
from already significant levels. By the early 1930s, Turkey was the world’s primary 
source of opium to the licit and illicit pharmaceutical industry; contributing 226 mt of 
the 390 mt total global supply of opium (Eisenlohr, 1934; see Block, 1989; Schmidt, 
1998). 
Turkish opium supplied French and Italian pharmaceutical companies, which 
illicitly exported heroin and morphine for recreational consumption. In 1928, for 
example, France imported three times the total global medicinal requirement of opium 
from Turkey (Block, 1989; see Meyer and Parssinen, 2002). Domestic opiate 
laboratories also used Turkish opium: few manufactured opiates for 
medicinal/scientific purpose (Times, 1931; League of Nations, 1936). In 1931, Turkey 
was suspected of producing at least 14 mt of unsupervised heroin and morphine every 
month in three factories in Istanbul (Schmidt, 1998). As the average ratio of opium to 
heroin is 10:1 (Zerel et al, 2005), the three opiate factories would have used 
approximately 140 mt of opium per month (Windle, forthcoming). 
After ratifying the International Opium Convention in 1933, Turkey enacted 
its first domestic drug control legislation (Government of Turkey, 1986a; West, 
1992): the Limitations Law (No. 2253) (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1950). Under the law, 
farmers could only cultivate opium in provinces with the government’s permission 
(Bulletin of Narcotics, 1950). The state began to gradually restrict permissible 
production areas to where authority was strongest (Akçasu, 1952; INCB, 1968, 1969, 
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1971; Greenfield and Nanby, 1974) and away from areas with easy export access 
(Windle, forthcoming). These bans, however, tended to be administered in provinces 
with the least significant output (Erinç and Tucdilek, 1952; Government of Turkey, 
1986a). 
Nominal controls over opium farmers were established in 1938 with the 
creation of the Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (TMO, Soil Products Office): a monopoly 
mandated to procure, store and export opium, and other agricultural produce (see 
CND, 1945; TMO-Alkasan, 1989). Control was based on the ineffective ‘opium 
declaration system’ (Akçasu, 1952; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974) in which farmers in 
designated provinces informed their Muhtar (village leader) what they expected to 
yield in the following season. The expectations were relayed to the Ministry of 
Agriculture. As farmers were expected to adhere to self-estimations, the system was 
(naively) based on the honesty of farmers (also League of Nations, 1938; Akçasu, 
1952; Murphy and Steele, 1971). All residents of designated provinces were permitted 
to produce opium without licence and were legally free to possess and store opium 
(see CND, 1944–1946, 1951–1955, 1957; Bulletin of Narcotics, 1949; Akçasu, 1952). 
Monitoring was conducted by the Muhtar, who was obliged to inform the TMO of 
any contravention (CINC, 1972). 
The remuneration system was equally ineffective. TMO prices ‘neither repaid 
[farmers] for their troubles and outlay nor gave them the profit they were entitled to 
expect’ (League of Nations, 1938, p. 45). As procurement practices were inefficient 
(Murphy and Steele, 1971), the majority of farmers continued to illicitly sell a 
significant percentage of the opium they produced (Akçasu, 1952; Lamour and 
Lamberti, 1974). 
In addition, poppy cultivation was permitted for the harvesting of seeds in 
many border provinces where opium production was prohibited (Bulletin of 
Narcotics, 1950). In 1968, Turkey admitted that it had been unable to administer 
effective controls over farmers in border areas (INCB, 1969, 1971; Greenfield and 
Nanby, 1974). This suggests that the state was unable to prevent farmers from 
extracting opium from poppies grown for their seeds (Windle, forthcoming). 
Furthermore, state institutions, including tax collection and law enforcement, 
were generally absent from rural areas before the 1940s, when they ‘became more 
effective and visible’ (Rustow, 1967; Zürcher, 1998, p. 216). Agricultural 
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development policies also increased access to rural areas through improvements in the 
transport infrastructure (Zürcher, 1998). 
Throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, Turkey remained one of the world’s 
largest sources of illicit opium (League of Nations, 1931; Bulletin of Narcotics, 
1953). In 1936, Turkey reported to the League of Nations (1938) that although 
significant tracts of land were cultivated with opium poppies, the monopoly price had 
been deflated by decreased foreign demand for medicinal opium. Consequentially, as 
farmers could not afford to hire labourers, 75–80 per cent of the crop remained 
unharvested. As controls over production and trade remained nominal, it is unlikely 
that 75–80 per cent was wasted, but rather diverted to black markets (Windle, 
forthcoming). This is not unreasonable: in 1941, less than 15 per cent of wheat 
production was surrendered to the TMO, even though all farmers were obliged (due to 
war time policy) to sell to the state monopoly. An unknown quantity was sold on the 
black market (Pamuk, 1991). 
 
The 1960s: Strengthening of Controls 
In the 1960s, to prevent diversion, the TMO increased its prices by 66 per cent, made 
it easier for farmers to deliver opium to monopoly agents, ensured all farmers were 
paid with cash (many had previously been paid with food coupons) and publicised 
penalties for noncompliance (CINC, 1972). Formal surveillance of opium farmers was 
also increased (Murphy and Steele, 1971). 
Regardless of administrative improvements, the monopoly remained a 
‘sometimes problematic, distant and lower-paying buyer’; often paying as little as 20 
per cent less than black market prices. Furthermore, farmers were forced to travel to 
sell to the state monopoly, whereas black market merchants would often visit villages 
(Evered, 2011b, p. 179). 
These administrative measures and the contraction of provinces did improve 
the amount surrendered to the monopoly (Turnbull, 1972) and led the UN Permanent 
Central Opium Board (PCOB) (1965, p. xxix) to note with ‘approval’ and 
‘satisfaction’ that restrictions were a ‘step in the right direction’ (PCOB, 1966, p. xx). 
The ‘declaration system’, however, remained insufficient: 
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Since yields varied from year to year, the farmer tended to 
understate expected yields for he was liable for prosecution if he did 
not deliver to the … [TMO] … the total amount of gum he had 
reported in his declaration. In general, little effort was made to 
question farmer declarations or to verify actual yield at harvest time. 
Thus, this system allowed for considerable opportunity for 
underreporting yields. (CINC, 1972, p. A3). 
 
One former opium farmer recalled how: ‘No permission slips or licenses were 
required; we just planted as much as we wanted and could harvest’. The primary 
limitation on opium production, at the time, was the labour intensity of opium gum 
harvesting, rather than the state (Evered, 2011b, p. 170). 
Government control was further diluted by farmer’s legal entitlement to 
possess unlimited quantities of opium (Murphy and Steele, 1971). In addition to 
bureaucratic weaknesses, the coercive arms of the state tended to be inefficient, under 
resourced and lacked training in narcotics control (Murphy and Steele, 1971; 
Newsday, 1974). 
Although the level of diversion may have been reduced by the innovations of 
the 1960s, diversion remained high. In 1961, America complained to the Central 
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) that 70 per cent of all heroin consumed in America 
was sourced from French heroin laboratories, supplied by ‘Middle Eastern’, primarily 
Turkish, opium. The accusation was not refuted by the Turkish delegate (British 
Foreign Office, 1961). This was followed, in 1966, by a complaint from Iran that 
Turkey supplied 25 per cent of its illicit opium supply (British Foreign Office, 1966). 
By the mid-1960s, the American estimate had increased to 80 per cent (Economist, 
1974; Lamour and Lamberti, 1974; Musto, 1987). While this estimate has been 
heavily criticised (Epstein, 1977; Government of Turkey, 1986a; Uslu, 2003; Evered, 
2011a), Turkey was the predominant source of opium for heroin destined for America 
(Rottenberg, 1968; Murphy and Steele, 1971; McCoy, 2003). 
During the mid/late-1960s, there was a divergence of opinion among 
American sources of the level of diversion. The Drug Enforcement Agency (1995) 
estimated that one-third of Turkish opium was diverted. The Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs compared expected and actual yields (Holahan and Henningsen, 
Windle, J. (2016). ‘Preventing the Diversion of Turkish Opium’. Security Journal, 
29(2), pp. 213-227. Pre-publication copy 
 
 
1972; Epstein, 1977) to estimate two-third diversion (cited in Holahan and 
Henningsen, 1972). The CINC (Committee on International Narcotics Control, 1972, 
see (Table 2) estimated that diversion decreased from 69.5 to 26 per cent, while an 
American ambassador to Turkey reported 25 per cent to a journalist (Epstein, 1977). 
Although the two-third estimate is often critiqued for methodological limitations 
(Robins, 2007), it was validated by an investigation conducted by reporters from 
Newsday (1974). Other journalists, conversely, reported 5 (Munir, 1970, cited in 
Robins, 2007) and 10 per cent by the late 1960s/early 1970s (Howe, 1980) (Table 1). 
The Turkish government admitted to the International Narcotics Control 
Board (INCB) (1974, p. 13) that ‘substantial quantities’ of opium were diverted 
during the 1960s. The INCB (1971, p. 13) summarised the 1960s: 
 
Frequent appearance in the illicit traffic of opium, or opium 
derivatives, known or presumed to have originated from Turkey has 
made this country a focus of international concern for a number of 
years. Counter-measures have not been lacking, yet the stream of 
such substances has persisted and has caused much disquiet … 
 
To summarise the level of diversion between the 1930s and 1971, reports to 
the League of Nations (1938) indicate diversion rates of between 75 and 80 per cent 
in 1936. This estimate can be placed with the estimates provided by the American 
agencies in the mid/late 1960s (discussed above) to produce three diversion rate 
parameters, expressed in Figure 1: a high (80 per cent), middle (66 per cent) and low 
(25 per cent) (Windle, 2011). 
Fluctuations within these three parameters appear to follow the subsequent 
trend, as expressed in Figure 1: Diversion appears high (80 per cent) from at least 
1936 (possibly peaking after the 1955 Iranian prohibition) to the 1960s when the 
imposition of more stringent controls make two-thirds (66 per cent) appear likely. By 
the early 1970s, the low parameter (25 per cent) appears feasible, although diversion 
may have been as low as 5 per cent (Windle, 2011). 
In summary, from the 1940s, Turkish controls were strengthened as the state 
extended authority into the countryside, while surveillance and procurement practices 
improved during the 1960s. This said, sanctions remained minimal and deterred few. 
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Ineffective procurement practices meant that the monopoly was unable to compete 
with black market traders who offered better prices and procured at the farm gate, 
while the naive opium declaration system presented significant opportunities for 
diversion (Windle, forthcoming). In short, Turkey lacked any effective mechanism to 
provide risks for diversion or rewards for compliance. 
This section has provided some background on the size of diversion, and the 
criminal justice and administrative mechanisms facilitating, or at least not preventing, 
diversion. The next section will address how Turkey suppressed and prevented large-
scale diversion of state-regulated opium. 
 
Table 1. CINC diversion estimates 
 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Percentage diverted 69.5 52.3 46.5 58 26 
In metric tonnes 205 137 110 80 49 
Source: CINC (1972). 
 
Figure 1. Turkey: Diverted opium (1931-1972) 
 
Sources: adapted from, Bulletin of Narcotics (1949, 1950); CINC (1972); Grey (1925); INCB 
(various years); League of Nations (1941, cited in Block, 1989); PCOB (various years).  
 
Opium Bans: 1971 and 1974 
The 1971 Opium Licensing and Control Law introduced licencing for opium farmers. 
Individuals with criminal records were barred from obtaining a licence (CINC, 1972), 
while possession of unlicenced opium was criminalised (GOA, 1972). Then, in the 
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late 1971, a new military regime banned all opium production, under Decree No. 
7/2654 (Kamminga, 2007; Robins, 2007). 
Although the ban was successful in terms of drug control (GOA, 1975; INCB, 
1972), it was deeply unpopular with rural communities (Klose, 1981; Government of 
Turkey, 1986a; Evered, 2011a, b), and urban populations who perceived the ban as 
submissive to American demands (Fyjis-Walker, 1974; Zürcher, 1998; Uslu, 2003; 
Robins, 2007; Evered, 2011a). In response to extensive opposition, the newly elected 
civilian government passed Decree No. 7522 in 1974. 
This Decree lifted the ban on opium poppy cultivation in seven provinces; 
however, it remained an offence to produce opium. A monopoly system was 
established whereby farmers were licenced to cultivate poppy straw (see UNFDAC, 
1975; Warren-Gash, 1975; Government of Turkey, 1986a; also Decree No.7/8522, 
1974; Decree No.7/9204, 1975). The production of morphine from poppy straw is 
significantly different from that of incising poppy pods (the previous harvest method). 
Although the poppy plant is cultivated in the same manner, at harvest the farmer is 
prohibited from incising the poppy pods to collect the opium gum. Instead, farmers 
cut and crush the poppies. The crushed poppies (the poppy straw) are then sold to the 
state. Morphine is then extracted from the straw using specialist and expensive 
technology (Mansfield, 2001; see Bayer, 1983). 
To assist Turkey, the UN part funded the construction of a poppy straw 
processing plant (Bayer, 1983; Kamminga, 2007). It also lobbied pharmaceutical 
companies to ensure the procurement of Turkish morphine (British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 1974) and provided funding for counter-narcotics and rural 
development (Kamminga, 2007). 
 
Post-1974 Controls 
After 1974, the opium monopoly continued to be administered by the TMO. Before 
harvest, the Council of Ministers annually instructed how much land, and in which 
province, could be cultivated with opium, and the number of licences available to 
each province (Mansfield, 2001). The amount of cultivable land allowed was based on 
estimates of global opiate needs produced by the INCB (Jensema and Archer, 2005). 
Farmers were then permitted to apply to the TMO for a licence (Government 
of Turkey, 1988) detailing: the size and location of farmland, the type of seed to be 
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used and irrigation sources. Licences could only be held by farmers who were over 18 
years of age, without a criminal record and lived on the land they were licenced to 
cultivate. Successful applicants were guaranteed by village Muhtars,2 who were made 
accountable for diversion. This placed a considerable social restraint on farmers (see 
Howe, 1980; Mansfield, 2001; also Jensema and Archer, 2005). 
During cultivation, teams of agricultural experts (Ajans) inspected licenced 
farmers a minimum of six times, formulated an expected yield and administered 
agricultural advice. To prevent corruption, all inspection results were signed off by an 
Ajan, the licensee and Muhtar. Excess cultivation was verified by a second team of 
Ajans (TMO-Alkasan, 1989; Mansfield, 2001). Ground inspections were effective as 
in ‘an otherwise dry environment, scars or blemishes on the capsules are immediately 
apparent to the eye when walking past such fields’ (Evered, 2011c, p. 5). The ground 
inspections were, nonetheless, supported by aerial surveys of all licenced areas 
(Greenfield, 1974; Turkish Embassy, London, 1975; Turkish National News, 1981; 
Government of Turkey, 1988, 1986b). The Muhtar was, furthermore, legally obliged 
to report any suspicious activities (Alexander, 2002). As the Muhtar was an elected 
part of the village government (Kolars, 1967), production was monitored by local 
community representatives. Once opium poppies became ripe for extraction, the TMO 
and gendarmerie increased their surveillance (UNFDAC, 1986) and placed 
undercover agents in areas where diversion was suspected (Greenfield and Nanby, 
1974; Government of Turkey, 1986b). Taken together, the risk of detection was high 
(Mansfield, 2001). 
The licensee was permitted to harvest the crop (that is, crush the poppies) once 
the Ajans confirmed that no pods had been lanced. Once harvested, farmers delivered 
the straw to the Ajans for weighing (UNFDAC, 1986; Government of Turkey, 1988; 
Mansfield, 2001). The state procured all opium at a generally fair (fixed) price. For 
example, an opium farmer interviewed by Evered (2011b, p. 180) recalled how she 
‘hoped that her descendants would be poppy farmers because they would “always 
have money in hand” ’. 
                                            
2 Muhtars are elected village representatives. They act as brokers between the state and 
village. Although their salaries are paid by the villagers they represent, they are officially 
employees of the Ministry of the Interior and legally obliged to report any unusual activity to 
the Kaymakam (provincial governor) (Alexander, 2002). 
Windle, J. (2016). ‘Preventing the Diversion of Turkish Opium’. Security Journal, 
29(2), pp. 213-227. Pre-publication copy 
 
 
Deviation from licence agreements could result in civil or criminal 
punishments. Communal punishments were also imposed. If the surrendered straw 
was significantly above or below the Ajan’s initial yield estimation, the farmer was 
referred to court (Government of Turkey, 1988; Mansfield, 2001; UNFDAC, 1986). 
All crops cultivated in excess of the licence agreement were eradicated, the farmer 
would be banned from obtaining future licences (Decree No. 7/9204, 1975; 
Government of Turkey, 1986a) and punished with between 1 and 5 years 
imprisonment (Law No. 3289).3 In 1975, 205 farmers who cultivated more than their 
licence permitted (Government of Turkey, 1986b) had their crops forcefully 
eradicated, were imprisoned and barred from obtaining future licences (UNFDAC, 
1975). Threat of punishment aside, the importance of opium as a cash crop made de-
licencing a significantly harsh economic sanction (Mansfield, 2001). 
Furthermore, communal punishments placed a social restraint on farmers. An 
entire community’s crops could be eradicated for the excess production of one farmer 
(ECOSOC, 1996, cited in Riley, 1993; Farrell, 1998), while the Muhtar could be 
heavily fined for failing to prevent or report diversion (Law No. 3298).  
Since 1974, America (NNICC, 1981, 1988; DEA, 1995; US State Department, 
1995−2013),4 Britain (Mansfield, 2001), Interpol (1988), UN (UNODCCP, 2000) and 
INCB (1975, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982) have reported how controls have limited 
diversion to almost nothing. As importantly, retired opium farmers interviewed by 
Evered (2011a, p. 310) recalled how the poppy straw method was profitable: ‘People 
planted again, got money, got married, got land and got tractors’. Part of the reason 
was that as poppy straw farming is less labour-intensive than harvesting opium gum, 
farmers could cultivate other crops or more poppies, depending on the permission of 
the state (Evered, 2011b,c). The following section will look at how, and why, the 
intervention was implemented. 
 
Implementation 
                                            
3 This increased in 1991 to between 10 and 20 years imprisonment (Jensema and Archer, 
2005). 
4 By 1975, even the hawkish Drug Enforcement Agency acknowledged that controls were 
‘remarkable effective’ (Warren-Gash, 1975 p. n.p.; Howe, 1980). 
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One of the most prominent barriers to implementing crime prevention is finding 
competent agents and persuading them to commit to a policy (Laycock and Tilley, 
1995; Laycock, 2006). At the top level of decision making, external actors, principally 
America (Uslu, 2003) and the UN (Greenfield and Nanby, 1974; INCB, 1974), had 
been pressuring successive Turkish governments to prevent diversion since the late 
1950s (Windle, forthcoming). Turkey eventually succumbed to external pressures 
because it felt that opium diversion was weakening its international reputation while 
damaging Turkish–American relations (America had threatened to remove economic 
aid) (Uslu, 2003). Increased revenue from taxation may have been an additional 
motivation. 
Coercion aside, the UN provided significant incentives, including part 
financing the poppy straw processing plant (Bayer, 1983; Kamminga, 2007), and once 
controls were administered providing US$5 million for counter-narcotic support 
(Land, 1981). Between 1974 and 1992, the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control funded: 
several vehicles (including 94 jeeps in 1974/1975), communication equipment, two 
aircrafts for aerial survey (one to the TMO and one to the gendarmerie) (Kayaalp, 
2001) and the construction of storage facilities (Government of Turkey, 1986a). The 
UN also provided counter-narcotics training and rural technical advice (Government 
of Turkey, 1986b). The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
provided financial advice and funded crop substitution projects in two opium-
producing provinces to lessen dependence on opium (UNFDAC, 1975; Kayaalp, 
2001). 
Three primary institutions, below the government, were persuaded to be 
responsible for monitoring licence adherence: The gendarmerie, TMO and farming 
communities. It is possible that TMO agricultural agents could have been 
uncomfortable with what may be perceived as a policing role and the gendarmerie 
with deviation from traditional law enforcement (see Pease, 2006). The external funds 
provided to the gendarmerie and TMO may, however, have facilitated compliance. 
The Turkish Interior Minister, for example, supported American calls for prohibition 
in 1968 as a mean of attracting resources (Uslu, 2003). In terms of Muhtars and local 
farming communities, it is likely that they were persuaded by being permitted to 
resume farming a profitable crop (INCB, 1972). 
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The government and external actors, therefore, used incentives as levers 
(Laycock and Tilley, 1995; Pease, 2006) to persuade competent institutions to 
implement the intervention. These incentives were supported by coercion in the form 
of legislation (that is, Degree 7/8522; Degree 7/9204) passed by a ‘strong, centralist, 
bureaucratic state’ (Koker, 1995, p. 52; Bovenkerl and Yesilgöz, 2006). These factors 
may have also reduced the fragility of interagency cooperation (Laycock and Tilley, 
1995) central to the intervention. 
Unlike many crime prevention policies, the interventions effectiveness did not 
‘fade over time’ (Laycock and Tilley, 1995, p. 565). This may have something to do 
with the economic, political and institutional self-interest of implementing 
institutions. Not only did farmers receive a steady income from a culturally important 
crop, but the state benefitted from taxes, external funding and points for good 
behaviour from the international community. The US State Departments annual 
narcotics control report, for example, would often commend Turkey for its success in 
preventing diversion. This may have buffered Turkey against some of the criticisms 
levelled at its negligent approach to counter-trafficking. In short, without positive 
reinforcement, and financial assistance from external agencies, it is possible that 
Turkey’s commitment may have waned. 
In addition, as the intervention made the Turkish supply more expensive and 
less available, traffickers may have turned their attention to cheaper and more reliable 
sources of production, such as Afghanistan. Deceasing demand may have helped 
maintain farming community’s compliance. 
While lack of information is often a major factor in policy failure (Laycock 
and Tilley, 1995; Bullock et al, 2002; Brown, 2006), the Turkish intervention started 
from an informed foundation. Not only had external agencies been collecting data on 
diversion for a number of years, the policy was the outcome of three decades of 
organisational learning about how to best prevent diversion (Windle, forthcoming). 
For example, without information about the mechanics of opium farming and 
diversion, the state would have been unable to direct its resources to the ‘hot spots’ 
and ‘hot times’ (that is, harvest) of diversion (Wikström, 1995). The information in 
addition helped establish well-defined policy aims and objectives, a factor proven to 
facilitate implementation success (Bullock et al, 2002; Brown, 2006). 
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In short, the intervention succeeded because it was theoretically sound and 
‘practical and realistic’, while political leaders (INCB, 1972, p. 20) and capable 
institutions were motivated through self-interest to successfully implement a policy 
built upon an informed foundation. 
 
Discussion 
It will be argued here that the primary factor in Turkish success was the 
administration of a combination of seven techniques provided by SCP to increase the 
effort and risk, while reducing rewards and removing excuses. Reuter (1985, p. 92) is, 
however, accurate that Turkish success was dependent on the presence of a strong 
central government, which ‘could enforce laws without risk of revolt’ (also Evered, 
2011b). The techniques of SCP would have been difficult to administer if the state 
had not increased authority over opium growing regions from the 1940s. 
The poppy straw process helped increase the effort it takes to divert opium. 
Poppy straw is bulky and therefore difficult to smuggle. The extraction of morphine 
from poppy straw involves the procurement of expensive technology, which is 
difficult to conceal. As such, traffickers have little interest in procuring poppy straw 
(Bayer, 1983; West, 1992; Mansfield, 2001). Although farmers could incise poppy 
capsules to extract opium gum, this was prevented by surveillance of opium poppy 
fields by Ajans and Muhtars during harvest. Therefore, although the poppy straw 
method increased the effort it took to divert opium, the effectiveness of controls 
centred upon a combination of preventive techniques. Contrary to some analysis, the 
introduction of the poppy straw method was insufficient by itself. 
Risk was increased by mandating elected village representatives to monitor for 
diversion, and by the threat of communal civil sanctions. American, Australian and 
British research suggests that the norm among many rural communities is to not 
report crimes, often due to distrust of the police (Donnermeyer et al, 2010). This 
distrust was magnified in rural Turkey where there was little state presence until the 
1940s. The provision of communal punishments, employment of village 
representatives and provision of economic incentives thus engineered guardianship. 
More formal surveillance was provided by gendarmes and agricultural experts. 
Anonymity was reduced by mandating all licenced poppy straw farmers to carry their 
registration identification while at work. 
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Table 2 SCP techniques employed to prevent diversion of regulated opium 
Increase the effort Increase the risk Reduce rewards Remove excuses 
Target harden: The 
poppy straw process 
makes it 
harder to divert 
opium to the black 
market 
Extend guardianship: 
Use of Muhtar and 
communal civil 
sanctions 
Fair prices and risk 
of arrest increase 
rewards for 
compliance and risks 
of non-compliance 
 
Set rules 
 Reduce anonymity: 
Licencing scheme 
IDs 
 
 Assist compliance: 
Fair prices and 
ease of sale 
 Strengthen formal 
surveillance: Police, 
aerial surveillance 
and agricultural 
experts 
  
 
The relative rewards of diversion were reduced by providing farmers with 
effective procurement practices offering fair prices and easy market access. 
Furthermore, by administering effective law enforcement, and advertising strict civil, 
criminal and communal punishments, the state reduced the rewards against the 
potential risk. 
Straightforward and simple procurement systems reduced excuses for farmers 
selling their produce on the black market. Farmers may have continued to risk selling 
opium to private (illicit) merchants if the state monopoly had failed to provide a fair 
price, quick payment or access to credit, especially as many merchants are willing to 
offer such benefits during the procurement of illicit opium (Chouvy and Laniel, 
2007). Excuses were limited by informing farmers of the rules of their licence and 
making them aware of potential sanctions.  
In terms of implementation, Turkey started from an informed foundation. This 
helped in the development of an intervention with focused aims and objectives, which 
dovetailed the self-interest of the state and implementing institutions (Table 2). 
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Conclusion 
Before 1972, Turkey was one of the world’s largest sources of illicit opium, the 
majority of which was diverted from the state monopoly. Since 1974, however, 
effective controls of poppy straw production have reduced diversion to almost 
nothing. Turkey thus represents an example of successful drug control and 
agricultural crime prevention. Although it is unfortunate that the policy was not 
analysed during the 1970s and 1980s, so that more specific data could have been 
collected, it is sufficient to show that diversion declined to almost nothing after the 
introduction of a combination of SCP techniques. 
The success of Turkish controls centred upon the administration of a number 
of – what would today be considered – SCP techniques. It increased the effort and risk 
of diverting opium, while removing excuses and reducing the rewards by increasing 
the relative rewards of compliance. Furthermore, the intervention was implemented 
by institutions motivated by economic, institutional and political self-interest, and 
based on an informed foundation. 
Evidence from this single case study may suggest that SCP techniques could 
be used to prevent the high levels of diversion reported in India, one of the world’s 
largest sources of licit opium to the pharmaceutical industry and, due to diversion, 
likely one of the world’s largest sources of illicit opium (Windle, 2011, 2012). 
Although careful analysis of the ‘local political, organisational and personal realities’ 
(Laycock and Tilley, 1995, p. 575) would of course be required. That there is, at 
present, little incentive for the Indian government and rural communities to support 
such a policy change may, however, represent a significant barrier. While recent 
reports on the estimated level of diversion (Mansfield, 2001; Paoli et al, 2009; 
Windle, 2011, 2012) have gone some way to highlighting the issue, given that little 
Indian opium is exported, it is unlikely that the government will be placed under the 
external pressures that helped motivate Turkey. A wider application of these findings 
is that opportunity theories may be particularly appropriate for the prevention of 
agricultural theft (Donnermeyer and Barclay, 2005; Mears et al, 2007; Donnermeyer 
et al, 2010). 
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